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The Greek welfare state in 
the age of austerity: anti-social 
policy and the politico-economic 
crisis
Theodoros Papadopoulos and Antonios Roumpakis
Introduction
Greece was the !rst of the countries in the EU periphery engulfed in the 
so-called sovereign debt crisis that followed the crisis in the !nancial and 
banking sectors. The sovereign debt crisis exposed the serious weaknesses 
of the politico-economic regime that shaped Greece’s development 
after the end of the military dictatorship in 1974. It also revealed 
the unprecedented power of unaccountable international !nancial 
institutions, banks and agencies to shape the dynamics of government 
bond markets across the globe and, therefore, the trajectories of national 
and regional political economies. More fundamentally, the Greek crisis 
exposed the limits of EU solidarity, and accelerated changes in the future 
politico-economic governance of the EU: the institutional innovations 
pursued as a means for managing the sovereign debt crisis, especially 
within the Eurozone, undermine national economic sovereignty to an 
unprecedented degree and, thus, place under serious question the role 
of national democratic politics in the process of EU integration.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the background to the 
crisis and explores how multiple and mutually reinforcing causes created 
the ‘perfect storm’ conditions for its eruption. This is followed by a critical 
presentation of the key austerity and deregulatory measures adopted 
by the Greek government until the end of December 2011. Most of 
these measures were preconditions for the tranches of the ‘bailout’ loan 
agreed with the so-called ‘troika’ of lenders, the ad hoc body comprising 
representatives of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European 
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Commission (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A 
discussion of the impact of austerity measures on the economy, welfare 
and society more generally, as well as our !nal re"ections conclude the 
chapter. It is argued that the austerity measures and the deregulatory, pro-
market, policy reforms prescribed by the ECB/EC/IMF and pursued 
by consecutive Greek governments have culminated in an anti-social 
policy that has done nothing to alleviate the crisis. Instead, it has severely 
reduced socio-economic security, traumatised social cohesion and 
democratic governance, and sunk the Greek economy into the deepest 
and most prolonged recession in recent memory with detrimental e#ects 
for the state’s !nances and Greek society more generally.
Explaining the Greek crisis: historical legacies and 
politico-economic dynamics
The story so far
By the end of 2008, the global crisis in the !nancial and banking sectors 
was engul!ng the majority of European economies. Despite the fact 
that Greek banks were not exposed to the so-called ‘toxic assets’, which 
had a particularly devastating impact in the US, UK, Ireland and Iceland, 
the government at the time (led by the centre-right New Democracy 
Party) sought to take pre-emptive measures. Following similar actions 
in other EU member states, the government provided a €28bn package 
(11.8% of Greek GDP for 2008) to support the Greek banking sector 
in order to boost liquidity, revive inter-bank loans and sustain economic 
growth. This package came on top of an already burdened budget that 
included, among others, meeting the excessive costs of hosting the 2004 
Olympic Games, continuing with the highest military expenditure 
in the EU (3% of GDP in 2008; see SIPRI, 2011), and servicing an 
already substantial public debt (approximately 110% of GDP in 2008; 
see IMF, 2011). With the economy in recession and amidst accusations 
of serious political mismanagement and economic scandals, the then 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis called for elections in autumn 2009.
Widespread media reports about a looming Greek crisis began 
in October 2009 when the newly elected PASOK government was 
reportedly ‘surprised’ to discover that Greece’s public budget de!cit 
was much higher than previously calculated by the Greek statistical 
authorities. It accordingly revised the o%cial estimate of the 2009 
annual de!cit from 6.7% to 12.7% of GDP. This !gure was later revised 
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act that, at the time of writing, was under judicial investigation (The 
Economist, 2011). These revisions – to be added to others before and 
since the country joined the Eurozone in 2001 – not only worsened the 
already damaged reputation of ‘Greek statistics’, but, more importantly, 
set o# alarm bells in the EC and ECB as well as the international 
!nancial markets and credit-rating agencies. Subsequent and consecutive 
downgradings of Greece’s creditworthiness increased the costs of 
borrowing and fuelled speculative attacks. With its credit ratings in free 
fall and its government bond spreads and sovereign credit default swaps 
(CDSs)1 reaching all-time highs (Gibson et al, 2011), Greece became 
the !rst Eurozone member state to formally seek !nancial assistance 
from the IMF and the European Union. On 23 April 2010, the then 
Prime Minister George Papandreou announced the Greek government’s 
request for activating an ad hoc support mechanism jointly supervised 
by the IMF/ECB/EC that was to provide a ‘bailout’ loan to Greece 
with lower-than-market interest rates.
On 3 May 2010, the so-called Memorandum of Understanding 
(!∀#μ ∀∃%) of the Loan Facility Agreement (LFA) was approved by 
the Greek parliament amidst massive demonstrations and street violence. 
Greece was promised €110 billion (€80 billion from Eurozone member 
states and €30 billion from the IMF) to be used solely to meet the 
liabilities to its debtors, that is, banks, !nancial institutions and states. The 
LFA involved a regime of very strict conditionality that was accompanied 
by what, by international standards, was an unprecedented loss of its 
national economic sovereignty. According to the LFA’s Article (5) ‘the 
Borrower [the Greek state] hereby irrevocably and unconditionally 
waives all immunity to which it is or may become entitled in respect of 
itself or its assets’, which e#ectively means that the Greek government 
voluntarily surrendered national sovereignty to its lenders and placed 
the country under a type of economic surveillance that could lead to 
claims over its resources and territory if the terms of the agreement were 
not ful!lled (LFA, 2010 [NIR?]). In fact, by October 2011, there were 
already calls by a number of Eurozone countries for the creation of a 
special task force by the EU to be given extra powers to oversee the sale 
of Greek state assets and the country’s civil service, which some o%cials 
described as ‘a form of colonialism’ (Reuters, 2011). Further, while the 
vast majority of the Greek bonds, prior to the LFA, were issued under 
Greek law, the ‘bailout’ loan under the LFA was issued under English 
law, which substantially weakened the position of Greece as a borrower. 
Overall, as Dizard (2010 [NIR? P.REF?]) put it:
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Greece is exchanging outstanding debt that is legally and 
logistically easy to restructure on favourable terms with debt 
that is di%cult or impossible to restructure. It’s as if they were 
borrowing from a Ma!a loan shark to repay an advance from 
their grandmother.
By July 2011, only part of the loan (€65 billion) had been released to 
Greece (see Table 10.1). The next tranche, scheduled for October 2011, 
was postponed until December 2011 due to ‘lack of progress’ with 
reforms demanded by the ECB/EC/IMF. Subsequently, it was further 
postponed to March 2012 depending upon Greece ful!lling various 
old and new requirements of the loan to the satisfaction of its creditors 
(Reuters, 2012).
By the middle of 2011, total Greek public debt was estimated to be 
approximately €360bn, comprising €285bn debt in bonds and €75bn in 
loans. Table 10.2 shows the distribution of holders of Greek government 
bonds and debt by the origin of !nancial institutions. The majority 
of the debt is owed to the ECB and the national banks (NBs) of the 
Eurozone countries, with the IMF holding a €15bn loan. Greek banks 
hold an estimated total of €57bn debt, while Greek pension funds 
hold an additional €30bn in bonds. French and German banks hold 
approximately €19bn and €15bn, respectively – several large private 
European banks, such as BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Generali 
hold signi!cant amounts of these bonds – while other private investors 
hold approximately €94bn in bonds and €16bn in loans (see Barclays 
Capital, 2011).
Table 10.1: Overview of disbursements, in billions of Euros, December 
2011
Tranche Disbursements Euro-area IMF Total
1 May 2010 14.5 5.5 20.0
2 Sep 2010 6.5 2.5 9.0
3 Dec 2010/Jan 2011 6.5 2.5 9.0
4 March 2011 10.9 4.1 15
5 July 2011 8.7 3.3 12
6 Dec 2011* 5.8 2.2 8
Total 52.9 20.1 73
 
Note: * Postponed until March 2012.
Source: European Commission (2011c).
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During the ad hoc talks of European leaders on 26 October 2011, a 
bond exchange was proposed with the overambitious aim of bringing the 
Greek public debt down to 120% of GDP by 2020, which, incidentally, 
was the level of debt in 2009, prior to the IMF/EC/ECB involvement. 
The proposed so-called ‘haircut’ involved the voluntary exchange of 
Greek government bonds with new bonds of up to 50% of the original 
value. However, it is to exclude the European and IMF parts of the 
Greek public debt, and concentrates mostly on domestic Greek bond-
holders (ie Greek banks and social security funds) as well as European 
banks and institutional investors. The announcements that followed this 
meeting were vague and many details were still to be decided at the 
time of writing, most important of which were the change of the legal 
framework regulating all bonds to be exchanged from Greek to English 
Law and the level of interest rate, which was expected to be higher than 
the original bonds. Any agreed ‘haircuts’ and bond exchange will touch 
upon the pro!tability of major European private !nancial institutions as 
well as the solvency of the Greek banking sector while the viability of 
Greek pension and health insurance funds, and their capacity to meet 
their social policy obligations (eg occupational pensions, health coverage 
liabilities), would be under serious question.
Table 10.2: Holders of Greek government bonds and debt, 2011
Bonds (€bn) Loans (€bn)
Europe (ECB, NBs) 49.0 38.0
IMF – 15.0
Greek banks 45.7 11.4
Greek public funds 30.0 –
Germany 15.2 –
France 19.1 –
Italy 4.7 –
United Kingdom 1.9 –
Rest of the World (Asia) 25.0 –
Others 94.4 16.0
Total 285.0 75.0
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimates from Barclays Capital (2011).
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Villains or victims: towards a synthesis of domestic and systemic 
explanations of the Greek crisis
Explanations of the causes of the Greek crisis oscillate between those 
that give emphasis to domestic causes and those that emphasise systemic 
reasons. For the former, the crisis is mainly attributable to the behaviour 
of a pro"igate society that ‘consumed beyond its means’, and its corrupt 
governments that ran large public debts and budget de!cits. As a result, 
when the 2008 global !nancial crisis erupted, con!dence in the capacity 
of the Greek state to service its debt plummeted and Greece was forced 
to seek the assistance of the IMF/EC/ECB. For the latter approach, the 
crisis was the outcome of chronic economic inadequacies and lack of 
policy options within the Euro, mostly outside the country’s in"uence, 
with domestic factors acting as triggers rather than as causes of the crisis. 
Our view draws from both approaches and argues that the eruption 
of the crisis was the combined result of ‘perfect storm’ conditions, 
both domestic and external, but also argues that the continuation and 
deepening of the crisis is a product of the very measures that were taken, 
supposedly, to alleviate it.
First, the crisis has to be understood in a historical context. There 
is a legacy of reoccurring defaults of the Greek state, as well as direct 
and indirect foreign interventions in the Greek politico-economic life 
related to servicing foreign-owned public debt (Levandis, 1944; Kofas, 
1989; Eliadakis, 2011). This legacy is also related to the emergence 
and position of Greece as a semi-peripheral economy in Southern 
Europe (Fotopoulos, 1985), highly dependent on capital from core 
lending countries and their economic trajectories. As Michael-Matsas 
(2010 [NIR? P.REF]) put it, ‘the history of Greek capitalism [and the 
Greek state] is the history of its bankruptcies’, which follow global 
crises with remarkable regularity. Indeed, the Greek state was declared 
bankrupt at least twice before the current crisis, in 1893 and 1932, 
closely following respective global Great Depressions. This reoccurrence 
has been attributed to the so-called ‘sudden stop’ in lending, a rather 
familiar pattern in the history of emerging economies (Calvo, 1998; 
Catao, 2006; Lazaretou, 2010 [NIR?]; Bordo et al, 2010), which also 
occurred recently in the Eurozone (Mansori, 2011). As Lazaretou (2010 
[NIR?], p 10) summarised it: ‘every time the economic and !nancial 
circumstances in the advanced lending countries changed leading to a 
cut o# of cheap capital in"ows to the emerging economies, the latter 
soon faced a balance of payments crisis and a debt crisis.’ Against this 
background, it can be safely argued that the 2007/08 !nancial crisis 
was not a direct cause of the Greek crisis and, indeed, Greece did 
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not immediately su#er the ‘!rst-order’ e#ects of the global crisis (see 
Farnsworth and Irving, 2011). Instead, the ‘sudden stop’ in lending that 
followed the global !nancial crisis operated as a catalyst to what was 
a disastrous combination of mutually reinforcing factors, of which the 
pivotal one, as we will demonstrate later, was Greece’s economic and 
!scal performance after the adoption of the Euro.
Focusing on the domestic factors, the politico-economic regime 
established after the collapse of dictatorship in 1974 used state resources 
and public borrowing not only as a means to legitimise the young 
democracy, but also to maintain the political reproduction of ruling elites 
(see Karamesini, 2008; Katsimi and Moutos, 2010; Kouvelakis, 2011) 
and facilitate their enrichment in the context of the semi-peripheral 
Greek political economy. This was particularly the case in the 1980s and 
early 1990s when the public debt ballooned due to excessive borrowing 
(see Figure 10.1), which was partly used to fund a substantial increase 
in public sector employment and a modest expansion of the welfare 
state, without increasing substantially the taxes on higher earners and 
businesses. In this respect, the current crisis in Greece is not purely 
economic or !scal in nature, it is deeply politico-economic, signalling, 
among other things, the exhaustion of the politico-economic regime 
that emerged in Greece in the last 35 years. This regime, characterised by 
state patronage and clientelism, tolerated extensive tax evasion practices 
(especially of higher earners, businesses and powerful individuals) while 
privileging speci!c socio-professional groups via a fragmented and highly 
unequal social security system (Petmesidou, 1991, forthcoming; Venieris, 
1997). Further, its corresponding semi-peripheral political economy was 
‘bene!ting’ from the functioning of a substantial underground economy, 
which utilised uninsured and precarious labour, keeping production 
costs low, while continuing with familistic welfare arrangements 
that ‘externalised’ the costs of social reproduction to Greek families 
(see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2009). These costs continued to 
remain low, especially since the mid-1990s, due to the extensive use of 
migrant workers, most of whom where undocumented, especially in 
the agriculture, construction and domestic/care sectors.
Regarding the systemic factors, one of the key economic consequences 
of Greece’s entry in the Eurozone in 2001 was the dramatic ampli!cation 
of the already widening asymmetries in productivity and competitiveness 
between Greece’s semi-peripheral economy and those of core EU 
countries, asymmetries that followed Greece’s entry into the EEC 
in 1981 (see Fotopoulos, 1993). Following the adoption of the Euro, 
economic growth in the Greek economy was maintained primarily by 
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boosting domestic demand through consumption and to a lesser extent 
investment in construction and real estate. While the supply of cheap 
credit from the ECB allowed the banking sector to expand rapidly, at the 
same time, the real economy did not yield enough streams of revenue to 
prevent the accumulation of high domestic debt while the trade de!cit 
worsened. While advanced core EU countries, like Germany, were able 
to constrain wages, maintain higher productivity rates and create trade 
surpluses (Lapavitsas et al, 2010), the only option for productively weaker 
states with chronic trade de!cits, like Greece, was to borrow in Euros 
from the markets, given that the Eurozone states cannot expand their 
money supply unilaterally. The combination of these systemic factors 
contributed towards the ‘twin de!cits’ of Greece: on the government 
budget and on the current account balance (see Figure 10.2). The end 
result was that the negative tendencies prior to the entry into the Euro 
(trade de!cits, dismantling of the structure of production, etc) were 
further ampli!ed. The lack of the policy option to issue its currency 
meant that, within the Euro, Greece’s semi-peripheral capitalism 
stood little chance of balanced endogenous growth (Lapavitsas, 2011; 
Polychroniou, 2011) similar to other semi-peripheral EU economies 
like Portugal and Ireland (Mansori, 2011).
Examining the composition of debt reveals another systemic trend that 
was a direct consequence of Greece’s joining the Eurozone, namely the 
rise in private debt. At !rst glance, as Table 10.3 demonstrates, when we 
Figure 10.1: Historical evolution of public debt as percentage of GDP in 
Greece, 1960–2010
Source: IMF (2011). [check alignment of vertical rules in this figure]
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compare private debt, including household and business credit exposure, 
Greece comes o# relatively well with one of the lowest levels of private 
debt (122%) in comparison to other EU countries. This can at least partly 
explain why Greece did not su#er the !rst-order e#ects of the original 
global crisis in 2008: the latter was about servicing private debt and the 
risk of defaults from private debt. Sovereign debt became an issue after 
the ‘sudden stop’ in lending took place following the original crisis.
Figure 10.2: Greece’s ‘twin’ deficits: budget and current account deficits, 
1999–2009
Source: IMF (2011b [NIR?]). [change hyphens to en-rules for minus signs?]
Table 10.3: Public and private* debt as a percentage of GDP, 2007–10
Net general government debt Private sector debt*
2007 2010 2007 2010
France 60 77 142 160
Germany 50 58 131 135
Greece 105 143 105 122
Ireland 11 78 241 305
Italy 87 99 122 133
Netherlands 22 28 209 217
Portugal 64 89 225 249
Spain 27 49 215 224
UK 43    67** 216    232**
 
Notes: * Includes household debt and non-financial corporate debt but excludes financial sector 
debt. ** UK data for 2009.
Sources: Data for UK from PricewatehouseCoopers (2010), calculations based on data from 
Office for National Statistics (2010). Data for all other countries from Papadimitriou and Wray 
(2011 [NIR?]).
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Still, despite the fact that Greek private debt is signi!cantly lower than 
other Eurozone countries and the UK, private debt and in particular 
household borrowing boomed with the coming of the Euro. In fact, it 
increased faster than the public debt (Lapavitsas et al, 2010) following 
a trend already set in the 1990s: since 1994 and up to 2006, the total 
increase of consumer credit touched upon the astronomic !gure of 
2,106% (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2009). Sanctioned by the Greek 
banks, and helped by lower interest rates, this expansion of consumer 
credit was mainly concentrated on mortgages and consumer loans and 
left Greek households exposed to unprecedented levels of debt when 
the crisis erupted.
Against this background, we argue that the eruption of the Greek 
crisis was due to the dramatic combination of both domestic causes and 
systemic trends that created ‘perfect storm’ conditions (on this point, see 
also Featherstone, 2011; Katsimi and Moutos, 2011 [NIR? 2010?]). By 
2009, when the budget de!cit and the current account balance were 
at their worst with a very large public debt, a substantial trade de!cit 
and a chronically weak productive base (that worsen after its entry into 
the Euro), the Greek government sought loans from the international 
markets at a time when the global !nancial crisis was still under way 
and lending was heading for a ‘sudden stop’. The PASOK government 
accepted the dramatic curtailment of national economic sovereignty as 
a price for the so-called ‘bailout loan’, and, under the strict supervision 
of the IMF/EC/ECB, began legislating and implementing austerity 
measures as preconditions of the loan’s tranches.
Austerity measures: the internal devaluation of 
Greece
The austerity measures and reforms that accompanied the IMF/EC/
ECB ‘bailout’ loan were unprecedented, in their scope, severity, volume 
and speed. Substantial income cuts and extraordinary increases in 
taxation, accompanied the extensive deregulation of Greek industrial 
relations, the abolition of many hard-won socio-economic rights of 
numerous professions both in the public and private sectors, as well as an 
ambitious programme of far-reaching privatisations of state enterprises 
and the selling-o# of public property. A selected number of them are 
critically presented below.
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Wages, unemployment benefits and conditions of labour
Even before the EU/IMF bailout, the period 1995–2010 was 
characterised by the expansion of precarious jobs in the formal labour 
market, both in the public and private sectors (Karantinos 2006; INE-
GSEE, 2008). As a precondition for the ‘bailout’ loan, the government 
accepted further moves towards the ‘"exibilisation’ of the labour market 
and strengthening of the rights of employers to ‘hire and !re’. Trade 
unions, meanwhile, would lose their right to refer to the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service following disputes with employers over wage 
increases and collective agreements. Additionally, employers are not any 
more obliged to o#er permanent contracts to employees on rolling 
temporary contracts. In June 2011, and in order to reduce government 
expenditure, 30,000 public servants, all aged over 60, were placed on an 
o%cial ‘labour reserve’, with the number expected to reach 100,000 by 
the end of 2012. Public servants with the status of ‘labour reserve’ will 
receive 60% of their salary for 12 months and if they are unable to !nd 
a job in the private sector, they will receive early (and reduced) pensions.
This planned ‘"exibilisation’ of the labour market was accompanied 
by a stagnation or even reduction of real wages. Already in 2008, 
a substantial percentage of the workforce (22%) received very low 
salaries, with the average wage estimated at 83% of the European 
average (INE-GSEE, 2008). This situation changed for the worse after 
the PASOK government began adopting the new measures. The IMF 
recommendation for a 15% wage decrease in the public and private 
sector was accepted and the minimum wage was reduced by 20% 
for workers under 24 years old, setting a monthly minimum wage 
of €595 (Megas, 2010). Further, as part of the medium-term !scal 
strategy and the pressures for additional structural reforms in 2011, the 
PASOK government introduced more cuts in wages that resulted in a 
25% total wage cut in the public sector, while, at the time of writing, 
the government was discussing the possibility of further reducing the 
minimum wage in the private sector to €560 per month, applicable to 
the total workforce, with under-24-year-old workers receiving even less.
Back in May 2010, the government introduced new legislation that 
placed new employment contracts in the public sector under severe 
constraints, as !ve existing public servants have to be !red or retire for 
one new opening. In June 2011, the government further constrained 
new recruitments, as the ‘one to !ve’ rule was replaced for the ‘one to 10’ 
rule. It also curtailed by 50% the ability of the local governments and the 
so-called wider public sector (public utilities) to hire personnel in 2011, 
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with an additional 10% reduction for each year up to 2015 (INE-GSEE, 
2011). Further, in November 2011, and as a precondition for the next 
tranche of the IMF/EU loan, the PASOK government introduced an 
amendment in collective bargaining and labour law that removed the role 
of national collective bargaining agreements and prioritised negotiations 
at the !rm level. Unions can be bypassed as workers can form ‘voluntary’ 
associations within the !rm. If the minimum majority of workers in a 
!rm accept the new wage agreement on wage and working conditions 
(eg three out of !ve workers) following individual meetings with their 
employer, then these become applicable to all workers at the !rm. The 
existing sectoral agreements, which will apply until 2014 regardless 
of future negotiations between unions and employers, set a de facto 
maximum on wages and erode working conditions. Mr Panagopoulos, 
President of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) and a 
PASOK syndicalist, summarised the mood of the trade unions as follows:
the government’s submissiveness has no end…. The government 
should not ‘toil’ to keep the country in Europe and in the Euro. 
With such decisions the government takes the Greek workers 
outside European protection, outside the European social acquis, 
outside the European civilization, i.e. outside what is the real 
Europe…. This !nal hour I urge the government not to legislate 
what the troika [IMF/EC/ECB] obliges, because it opens the 
door (more appropriately tearing down the walls) for wages and 
industrial relations of the type that exist in China, India and third 
world countries. (Panagopoulos, 2011)
Conditions for the unemployed have also deteriorated in recent years. 
Unemployment bene!ts in Greece have for decades remained very low 
in comparison to European averages with eligibility criteria strictly 
linked to previous employment records, thus excluding !rst entrants 
and the young unemployed or those with poor contribution records 
(Papadopoulos, 2006). While unemployment bene!t (currently at €461.5 
per month) is still well below the poverty line, lasts for a maximum of 
one year and has no follow-up bene!ts for the long-term unemployed, 
the government announced in April 2010 that state support towards 
the unemployed was to be reduced by €500 million (Kostarelou, 2010) 
at a time when unemployment was increasing rapidly.
215
The Greek welfare state in the age of austerity
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8
9 
10 
11
12
13
14 
15 
16
17 
18
19
20
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28
29 
30 
31
32 
33 
34 
35 
36
37 
38 
39 
40
41
Tax measures
As a desperate measure to increase the revenues to the state budget, the 
government decided to increase the standard rate of VAT to 23% (up 
from 19%) in July 2011, for medical services to 13% (up from 9.5%) 
and for books and newspapers to 6.5% (up from 4%). The increase of 
the standard rate was also accompanied with new listings of products 
that were previously taxed with the medium tax rate (eg restaurants, 
taverns). Additional increases applied to excise duties for petrol, gas, 
tobacco and alcohol. Thus, while wages and pensions are being curtailed, 
the cost of living is being increased. Further, the Greek government 
reduced the income tax threshold twice, !rst in May 2010 when it was 
set at €9,000 (from €12,000) and then in September 2011 when it was 
further reduced to €5,000.
Under the tax law of March 2011, a withholding tax of 25% shall be 
levied from 2012 on pro!ts distributed by corporations, limited liability 
companies and cooperatives; for the year 2011, the withholding tax rate 
was 21%. Still, corporate taxation, which had already been reduced by 
40% in 10 years (from 40% in 2000 to 24% in 2010), was to further 
drop to 20% under the new tax law. Also enacted were generous tax 
incentives for new enterprises, reaching up to !ve years of free taxes.
Finally, in September 2011, the government also introduced a 
controversial new property tax on top of existing ones for more than 
5 million private houses and commercial properties, with the aim to 
achieve annual revenues of €2bn. The total bill for each household 
depends on the size of the property as well as the location but, crucially, it 
is not linked to any means testing or any ability-to-pay test. This tax hits at 
the core of the main pillar of socio-economic security of Greek families 
(Allen et al, 2004) – home ownership and small private property – and, in 
an unprecedented move, will be collected via electricity bills. In case of 
refusal to pay, electricity supply will be cut o# from the property, a very 
controversial measure that met tough resistance by electricity workers’ 
unions who declared that they will refuse to implement such orders.
Pensions
Already by 2008, the Greek centre-right government had introduced 
a series of parametric [term ok?] changes in the pension system. 
These changes strengthened the links between contributions and 
pension income, increased the statutory retirement ages and altered the 
calculation of pension bene!ts and included, among other measures, a 
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6% pension reduction penalty for each year of early retirement. However, 
the policy impetus towards further cutbacks accelerated following the 
eruption of the crisis. There have been two waves of pension reform: 
one as part of the !rst tranche of ‘bailout’ loan in May 2010 and one 
during the adoption of the ‘medium-term !scal strategy’ that followed 
the !fth tranche in July 2011. The changes have touched upon stricter 
eligibility rules, lower replacement rates and lower contribution levels 
for employers. As it will be argued, the reforms not only curtail public 
spending, but also essentially question the ‘social’ and ‘redistribution’ 
principles of the system.
By May 2010, the PASOK government universally reduced pension 
incomes while the contribution years necessary for entitlement to a full 
pension increased from 35 to 40. For a full pension, the retirement age is 
set to 65 for both men and women, with early retirement at the age of 
60 requiring 35 years of contributions. Previously, pension entitlement 
was calculated on the basis of the last !ve years of employment, but, since 
2010, the formula includes all working years (GGG, 2010). Changes in 
eligibility were accompanied by curtailments in the pension replacement 
rates. Maxima on pension incomes were enacted (currently €2,500 
per month) while a pension amount equal to two monthly payments 
(the so-called 13th and 14th month payments) was replaced by a !xed 
amount (€1,000), leading to further reductions. Substantial cuts of the 
so-called auxiliary pension supplements (which were !nanced solely by 
employer and employee contributions) were planned for 2012, which 
in some cases could reach 80%.
More important, however, was the regressive increases of replacement 
rates of future pensioners with higher wages and longer contribution 
records. According to new legislation, the pension system removes any 
redistribution from higher- to lower-income earners and, instead, uses 
contributions from low-income workers to !nance higher pensions 
for high-wage earners. While the pension pot remains collective, the 
reward and the calculation of pension entitlement is divided among 
wage groups, with higher-income groups awarded pensions with higher 
replacement rates. The new average replacement rate for !rst-pillar 
pensions is to fall from 70% to 42.5%, while pensioners with disrupted 
and insu%cient employment records are to be ‘awarded’ a pension with 
an, even lower, 30% replacement rate, a measure that will hit hard those 
in precarious employment and women. One can easily question why 
employees’ should continue to contribute with the same rates, only to 
receive substantially lower pensions.
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In terms of !nancing, the Greek pension system is based on a tripartite 
agreement with employers, employees and the government. In June 2010, 
the government announced that it will halt all payments towards pension 
contributions and that the state will no longer !nance the existing 
pension schemes. In 2012, employers’ contributions will be reduced by 
10% and it is estimated that further reductions up to 25% will apply by 
2015. Additionally, the government charged pensioners earning more 
than €1,400 (monthly) a 3–7% ‘solidarity tax’ (LAFKA/&∋()∋) on 
!rst-pillar pensions in order to !nance its own contributions towards 
social assistance supplements. Essentially, this tax is not an additional 
measure of government spending, but is replacing the government’s 
contributions, thus reducing government total budgetary payments and 
possibly borrowing needs.
In October 2011, and in order for the Greek government to secure 
the ‘sixth support package’, it introduced a new pension reform, which 
curtails:
?? 40% of the pension entitlement of retirees younger than 55 years old;
?? 20% of all pension income that exceeds €1,200;
?? 30% of any occupational pension that exceeds €150; and
?? a minimum of 15% on all public sector lump sum payments 
(retrospectively since 1 January 2010).
At the same time, the government increased the ‘solidarity tax’ from 3% 
up to 14% of pension income in excess of €1,400, while for pensioners 
younger than 60 years old, an additional tax of 6% up to 10% will apply 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011). Additional new charges (2%) will be applied 
to public sector pensioners in order to fund future lump sum payments. 
In terms of eligibility changes, the government increased the requirement 
for early retirement from 35 to 37 contribution years.
Amid the cuts, the government introduced a plan for a basic pension 
of €360, to be introduced in 2018 and funded from general tax revenue 
and privatisations. This entitlement will be linked partly to the changes 
in GDP and price indexation in 2014 (INE-GSEE, 2010). So far, 
there is uncertainty as to who will be eligible for this basic pension 
but one cannot fail to admit that the model envisioned by the current 
government resembles a residual model (Venieris, forthcoming). Further 
to this, occupational pension schemes are under huge pressure, not least 
due to lower wages and employment rates that do not channel enough 
contributions to the funds. The government has reduced occupational 
schemes’ institutional role through lower replacement rates, ceilings 
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on contributions and the removal of state guarantees for occupational 
scheme entitlements. What emerges here is the government’s intention 
to minimise the role of occupational pensions following the planned 
changes in collective bargaining. This conclusion is further supported 
by the fact that occupational pension funds have been forced to buy 
Greek state bonds in the past, a political act that essentially transferred 
pensioners’ money to the government budget. According to the 26 
October 2011 proposals, social insurance funds will be forced to accept 
a 50% ‘haircut’ in the value of the Greek bonds they own, and will most 
likely face solvency issues or even be taken over by the state, the very 
state that historically obliged them to buy its bonds.
Impact on economy and society
What was presented earlier represents only a selection from the plethora 
of austerity measures enacted and implemented since 2010. The PASOK 
government’s aim was to meet the target of reducing the de!cit to 8.5% of 
GDP by the end of 2011 with further substantial reductions in 2012; the 
ambition being to eliminate the de!cit by 2013 and even generate some 
modest primary surplus. So far, these measures have had a devastating 
impact on the Greek economy, plunging it into a deep recession from 
which no end is yet visible. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2009, 
Greek GDP has contracted by nearly 15%, while it is estimated that it 
will contract by 5.5% in 2011 (OECD, 2011 [NIR?]). Subsequently, 
public debt as a percentage of GDP increased spectacularly (see Figure 
10.1) and is expected to increase even more as Greece continues to use 
its loans to solely serve its lenders while failing to revive its economy or 
drastically improve trade account balances. A con!dential report on the 
sustainability of Greece’s debt (IMF/EC/ECB, 2011; see also Eurobank 
Research, 2011) estimated that the debt will reach 172.7% of GDP in 
2012 (approximately €373 billion) from 120% in 2009, the year prior to 
the IMF/EC/ECB ‘bailout’ loan. The rather over-optimistic estimations 
of the government for 2012 anticipated a further contraction of GDP 
by 2.5%, putting in serious doubt whether there will be any return to 
positive rates of GDP growth from 2013 onwards. Rapid decline in 
domestic demand, industrial output and bank savings, the collapse of 
consumer con!dence, and dramatic increases in unemployment were 
to a large extent the results of the state taking billions of Euros out 
of the Greek economy by means of relentless taxation and substantial 
reductions in pensions and wages. In this respect, and regardless of the 
original causes of the Greek crisis, it is clear that the measures taken so 
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far have failed spectacularly – as admitted by key ministers who oversaw 
their introduction and implementation (Chrissochoides, 2011; Venizelos, 
2011) – and in fact led to the dramatic worsening of the crisis. This 
evaluation assumes of course that the measures’ original aim was to assist 
Greece in recovering from the crisis with reforms that were to help 
the economy instead of primarily securing the interests of investors and 
banks, domestic and international; for, so far, these interests have been 
served remarkably well.
Nevertheless, more measures are planned for the very near future, 
which include further reductions in the wages of public sector employees, 
further tax increases, as well as the redundancies of thousands of public 
sector employees, and some are already being implemented. However, 
the ‘jewel’ in the crown of the measures demanded by the IMF/EC/
ECB ‘troika’ as a prerequisite for the, twice-postponed, 6th tranche of 
the loan involves extensive privatisations and the selling of numerous 
public assets and government stakes in companies (the railway company, 
Hellenic Defense Systems, the port of Piraeus, Hellenic Postbank, the 
telephone company, motorways, the Athens airport and the Greek 
lottery and related group of companies), which, by 2015, should raise 
€50 billion. As the German magazine Der Spiegel (2011) put it, this is 
nothing short of the ultimate ‘selling o# the Family Silver’.
For most Greeks, the reality under the austerity measures signalled ‘the 
end of the world’ as they knew it. The o%cial unemployment rate more 
than doubled – from 7.4% in May 2008 to 18.8% in September 2011 
(Eurostat, 2011 [NIR?]) – with women and especially young people 
hit particularly hard. For the latter, migration emerges as the main exit 
route to !nd employment. By 2010, o%cial statistics recorded 27.7% of 
the population as at risk of poverty, the highest percentage among the 
EU15 (ELSTAT, 2012 [NIR?]). Of children aged 0–17 years old, 23% 
were estimated to be at risk of poverty in 2010 while, in early 2012, the 
British media reported that increasing numbers of !nancially desperate 
Greek parents were giving their children to charities or institutions 
run by the Greek Church as they were unable to provide for their care 
(BBC World Service, 2012). At the same time, while businesses are either 
closing down or !ring their employees, job creation has stagnated to 
bottom levels both in the private and public sector. Since January 2009 
and until August 2011, 68,000 businesses (15% of the total) have gone 
bust (Kathimerini, 2011) while thousands more (approximately 10% of 
the remaining total) reported severe di%culties in meeting their credit 
obligations (ICAP, 2011). According to statistics from the National Bank 
of Greece (2011), the distribution of private debt among household 
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and business debt reached 59.2% and 60.2% of GDP, respectively. The 
same report highlighted serious delays in the payment of mortgages 
while non-payment of consumer loans had reached 20%. More recent 
surveys in the Athens area reported that six out of 10 households !nd 
it very hard to meet their tax obligations, loans and utility bills, while 
52% reported di%culties in meeting even their basic everyday needs 
(IME-GSEBEE, 2012).
Apart from a small minority, most Greek families have experienced 
a dramatic decrease in their well-being and their socio-economic 
security, as repeated surveys in subjective economic hardship reveal. 
Gallup’s ongoing Global Wellbeing Survey reported that 60% of Greeks 
were ‘struggling’ with their current life in 2011, with the percentage 
of those reporting ‘thriving’ collapsing from 44% in 2007 to 16% in 
2011. Further, ‘the percentage of Greeks who rate[d] their lives so 
poorly that they are considered “su#ering” has more than tripled to 
25% in 2011, from 7% in 2007’ (Gallup, 2011a), the highest percentage 
among the Eurozone countries. Using questions measuring the Index 
of Personal Economic Distress (IPED), a recent epidemiological study 
conducted by the Athens University Research Institute for Psychiatric 
Health found that 16.5% of respondents reported very high economic 
distress in 2011, an increase of approximately 20.4% in comparison to 
2009 (URIPH, 2011). The same study recorded substantial increases in 
feelings of melancholy, symptoms of clinical depression, suicidal thoughts 
and self-reported suicidal attempts. Regarding the latter, approximately 
1.5% of the sample reported having made a suicide attempt when the 
respective !gure for 2008 was 0.6%. Against this background, it comes as 
no surprise that the reported number of suicides attributed to economic 
hardship increased by 40% in the !rst !ve months of 2011 – the vast 
majority of which were males aged 35 to 60 – while the total number 
of suicides doubled in the years of the crisis (Violantzis, 2011). These are 
unprecedented !gures for Greece, a country that traditionally recorded 
one of the lowest suicide rates in the EU.
At the same time, a large number of publicly provided services and 
sectors (eg hospitals, schools, universities, welfare services) are facing a 
double challenge. On the one hand, they have to o#er their services 
under serious economic constraints, reduced sta# and budgetary cuts as 
the state withdraws its funding. On the other hand, it is reasonable to 
assume that they will face substantial rises in the demand for their services 
given that large parts of the middle classes will begin withdrawing from 
private services as their incomes diminish, and, further, that the demand 
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on the voluntary and non-governmental sector to !ll the gap will 
intensify as some newspaper reports already indicate (Eleftherotypia, 2011).
Conclusion
The promises of a bright economic future that accompanied Greece’s 
entry into the Eurozone in 2001 proved unfounded. Nine years later, 
Greece !nds itself in a dire !scal state, having surrendered substantial 
parts of its national economic sovereignty and having to implement 
very harsh austerity measures under the surveillance of its lenders. So 
far, the reforms prescribed by the ECB/EC/IMF and, to a large extent, 
implemented by Greek governments have done nothing to alleviate 
the crisis. Instead, they have severely reduced socio-economic security, 
undermined social cohesion and sunk the Greek economy into the 
deepest and most prolonged recession in recent memory, with no end 
in sight.
Similar to other nation states (Farnsworth and Irving, 2011), 
employment and social policy (especially pensions) were at the heart 
of the structural reforms. Although the character and direction of these 
reforms were similar to those attempted before the crisis, the adoption 
of the austerity measures accelerated their pace, and paved the way for 
even more reforms that previously met the resistance of the electorate, 
unions and many socio-professional groups. At the same time, in order 
to supposedly boost competitiveness and exports, both the PASOK 
government and the tri-party government of national accord that was 
in place at the time of writing – led by Mr Papademos, an unelected 
ex-banker – opted for a dual strategy of ‘internal devaluation’ and 
indiscriminate taxation of the working population and pensioners; that 
is, a strategy of severely reducing wages and labour costs, cutting welfare 
bene!ts, services and pensions, and increasing taxation regardless of 
ability to pay. It appears that the solution that these governments opted 
for was to transfer the risk, the cost and the responsibility of the economic 
crisis to the easy targets – the salariat working population and pensioners, 
in both the public and private sectors – and attack the main pillar of 
their socio-economic security – small private property – while keeping 
other sectors and practices protected. Instead of revisiting the role of 
the banking sector and the lack of investment in the real economy or 
seriously tackling tax evasion and corruption, endemic at the elite level 
in both the private and public sectors, or take the reorganisation of the 
state seriously, both governments picked a di#erent enemy: social and 
employment security, wage and pension incomes, and working standards.
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Taking as a starting point that even after two years of austerity the 
Greek economy is in a weaker position, there is not much scope for 
any optimism regarding welfare futures. In political terms, the policies 
of the PASOK government came in striking contrast with its electorate 
promises of centre-left inspiration back in 2009 by putting forward one 
of the harshest and most punitive packages of pro-market austerity 
measures in recent European history. They have culminated in an anti-
social policy that wreaked havoc upon Greek society, forcing large parts 
of the population into severe insecurity. With many households and 
family businesses indebted and unemployment soaring, the middle and 
working classes are experiencing a free fall in their living standards and 
their faith in the politico-economic institutions, domestic and European, 
has understandably been seriously challenged. In a 2011 Gallup poll, 77% 
of Greek respondents said that they had no con!dence in the national 
government and 78% said that they had no con!dence in !nancial 
institutions or banks (Gallup, 2011b). Further, in a 2011 Eurobarometer 
survey, 83% declared that they did not trust the government, 82% that 
they did not trust the parliament and 67% that they did not trust the 
EU (compared with an EU average of 47%), while 75% said that the 
EU was not e#ective in combating the crisis (Eurobarometer, 2011). 
Hence, our assertion that the crisis is not only economic, but deeply 
politico-economic, signalling the end of the post-dictatorship politico-
economic regime in Greece while seriously questioning the direction 
of EU integration and the role of national democratic politics within 
it. We would expect a radicalisation of political opinion and behaviour 
to rea%rm territorial and political control over the Greek economy, but 
any misfortune will directly spark rifts with the EU. Still, as a consolation, 
Greeks do not seem to be all alone in the EU in questioning both their 
domestic regimes and the direction and scope of the further politico-
economic integration of the Eurozone. Countries in the EU periphery 
are undergoing very similar ‘treatments’ and, if Greece is to be taken as 
the testing ground, they will also face pressures for substantial reductions 
in their national economic sovereignty. As Mark Mazower (2010 [NIR? 
2011? P.REF]), historian of modern Greece, put it:
The European Union was supposed to shore up a fragmented 
Europe, to consolidate its democratic potential and to transform 
the continent into a force capable of competing on the global 
stage. It is perhaps !tting that one of Europe’s oldest and most 
democratic nation-states should be on the new front line, throwing 
all these achievements into question. For we are all small powers 
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now, and once again Greece is in the forefront of the !ght for 
the future.
Note
1 The so-called spread represents the di#erence in the interest that 
!nancial market institutions are willing to charge in order to buy Greek 
government bonds over the interest they are willing to charge in order 
to buy German government bonds. A CDS is a !nancial instrument 
resembling, to some extent, a traditional insurance policy where, for a fee, 
the issuer of the CDS promises to pay the face value of the loan that the 
buyer of the CDS had issued in the case of loan default. However, there 
is a fundamental di#erence between a CDS and the classic insurance 
policy. A CDS can also be purchased by a buyer who has no exposure 
to the loan for which the CDS was issued. This so-called naked CDS 
is e#ectively a speculative bet where the buyer gains when the loan 
that s/he is not exposed to defaults. Even well-known !gures of the 
!nancial world described naked CDSs as ‘toxic’ and called for their strict 
regulation (Soros, 2009).
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